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Private Gated Communities in the

American Urban Fabric:

Emerging Trends in their

Production, Practices, and Regulation

by

Evan McKenzie

Political Science Department

University of Illinois at Chicago

1007 W. Harrison St.

Chicago, IL 60607 USA

voice: 312-413-3782

fax: 312-413-0440

mckenzie@uic.edu

Presented at conference on

“Gated Communities: Building Social Division or Safer Communities?”

18-19 September 2003, Department of Urban Studies, University of Glasgow, Scotland

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Pomoerium

Article by Leonhard Schmitz, Ph.D, F.R.S.E, Rector of the High School of

Edinburgh

on pp930-931 of

William Smith, D.C.L., LL.D.:

A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities, John Murray, London, 1875.

POMOERIUM.

manner as pomeridiem of post and meridiem, and thus signifies a line running by the

walls of a town (pone or post muros). The pomoerium, however, did not consist of the

actual walls or fortifications of a place, but was a symbolical wall, and the course of the

pomoerium itself was marked by stone pillars (cippi pomoerii, Varro,

ed. Müller), erected at certain intervals. The custom of making a pomoerium was

common to the Latins and Etruscans, and the manner in which it was done in the earliest

times, when a town was to be founded, was as follows: — A bullock and a heifer were

yoked to a plough, and a furrow was drawn around the place which was to be occupied

by the new town, in such a manner that all the clods fell inward. The little mound thus

formed was the symbolical wall, and along it ran the pomoerium, within the compass of

which alone the city-auspices (auspicia urbana) could be taken (Varro,

That the actual walls or fortifications of a town ran near it, may naturally be supposed,

though the pomoerium might either be within or without them. This custom was also

followed in the building of Rome, and the Romans afterwards observed it in the

establishment of their colonies. The sacred line of the Roman pomoerium did not prevent

the inhabitants from building upon or taking into use any place beyond it, but it was

necessary to leave a certain space on each side of it unoccupied so as not to unhallow it

by profane use (Liv. i.44).

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This word is compounded of post and moerium (murus), in the samede Ling. Lat. v.143,de Ling. Lat. l. c.).

Introduction

Privately governed residential enclaves known as common interest housing developments

(CIDs), many of them gated and walled, are the predominant form of new housing in America’s

fastest growing cities and suburbs. Over the last 25 years, this massive privatization of local

government functions has changed the appearance and organizational structure of American

urban areas. This trend is not a passing fashion but an institutional transformation reflecting the

ideological shift toward privatism characteristic of the neoliberal consensus. Specifically, the

CID revolution is driven by three main forces. Developers pursue higher density in order to

maintain profits despite rising land costs. Local governments seek growth and increased tax

revenues with minimal public expenditure. And many middle and upper class home-buyers,

fearful of crime and disenchanted with government, are in search of a privatized utopia—or, as I

call it, privatopia--offering security, a homogenous population, and managerial private

government.

This transformation resembles the construction of a physical and institutional

or sanctified wall, around the affluent portions of an increasingly divided society. Nowhere in the

United States is this transformation more visible than in Las Vegas, Nevada--the fastest growing

city in the nation, and one that exemplifies the national and global trend toward placing tourism at

the center of the urban economy and reshaping the spatial, social, and political order accordingly.

Las Vegas area local governments require developers to construct virtually all new housing in

CIDs, and gated security developments are popular. So popular, in fact, that non-CID

neighborhoods come under pressure to emulate CIDs. One such neighborhood, Bonanza Village,

was literally walled in by the City of Las Vegas, over the protest of many of its residents, in order

to make the old neighborhood resemble contemporary gated communities and thus link it with

downtown redevelopment. This episode illuminates the interplay of public and private forces that

are reshaping American cities.

I deeply appreciate the assistance of Monica Caruso and Anthony Caruso of Las Vegas,

who spent a great deal of time assembling the documents on the Bonanza Village episode that

enabled me to tell that story here. The photographs of Bonanza Village and the surrounding area

which accompany the Powerpoint presentation of this paper were taken on May 16, 2001, by

Monica Caruso.

pomerium,

PRODUCTION:

RESIDENTIAL PRIVATE GOVERNMENT AND GATED COMMUNITIES

Privately governed residential enclaves known as common interest housing developments

(CIDs), about one-fifth of them gated and walled (Blakely and Snyder 1997, 180n1) are the

predominant form of new housing in America’s fastest growing cities and suburbs. Over the last

25 years, this massive privatization of local government functions, consisting of over 200,000

housing developments containing at least one-eighth of the nation’s population, has changed the

appearance and organizational structure of American urban areas.

Common interest housing includes planned developments of single family homes,

townhouses, and condominiums. These developments involve a form of ownership in which

home buyers purchase both an individual interest in a particular unit and another interest,

consisting often of streets, recreation centers, golf courses, and other facilities, which they own in

common with all residents in the development. They buy their property subject to voluminous

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sets of deed restrictions, rules, and regulations, under which all owners agree to make monthly

payments to a homeowner association, a private government into which all residents are enlisted

at the moment of purchase. The association is run by the residents, supported by cadres of

lawyers and other professionals, and it enforces the deed restrictions against all residents and

manages the use of property and other aspects of life in the development. Increasingly, CID

housing involves homeowner association-administered security measures, which typically include

walls and gates, and may involve hiring guards and even private police forces.

There is considerable disagreement over the causes and effects of this phenomenon. I

have argued that the CID revolution is driven by the motivations of developers and local

governments on the supply side, and consumers on the demand side, with the supply side interests

predominating over the demand side. (McKenzie 1998a)

Developers have found that CIDs help them pursue higher density, in order to maintain

profits despite rising land costs. They can put more people on less land, and also provide

amenities to buyers, by creating common ownership of parks, swimming pools, and so forth.

Local governments seek growth and increased tax revenues with minimal public expenditure.

CIDs privatize what would otherwise be government responsibilities and place these burdens in

the hands of homeowner associations, whose members pay for them through monthly

assessments. These associations arrange for trash collection, plow snow in the winter and move

leaves in the fall, repair and light streets, run parks, and do many other things that government

would otherwise have to do in order to enjoy the increase d tax revenues from new development.

Thus cities can acquire new property tax payers without having to extend to them the full panoply

of municipal services.

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But the demand for such a lifestyle cannot be ignored. Many middle and upper class

home-buyers, fearful of crime and disenchanted with government, are in search of a privatized

utopia offering security, a homogenous population, and small-scale managerial private

government that enforces high standards of property maintenance. For many people, the gated

community is especially attractive, as it adds fortification to all the other attributes of CID living.

I have argued that the rise of residential private government facilitates the emergence of a

two tier society in which the “haves” are increasingly separated—spatially, institutionally,

socially, and economically—from those of lesser means. I call this realm “privatopia” because it

represents the pursuit of utopian aspirations through privatization of public life. And within

privatopia the terms and conditions of life are at odds with the norms and expectations of liberal

democracy. Residential private governments, known generically as “homeowner associations,”

are not restricted by conventional notions of civil liberties and due process of law, and their

activities are supported by a powerful cadre of professionals, including lawyers, property

managers, accountants, and others.

Yet, many observers see the situation quite differently. Some argue that the CID

revolution is merely a manifestation of consumer sovereignty, representing the collective

preferences of millions of home buyers. This demand side logic reaches its greatest extent with

the libertarian justification of homeowner associations as private protective associations, a view

anticipate d in Robert Nozick’s major work, Anarchy, State, and Utopia . By this logic, discussion

of the social effects of these millions of individual choices is largely irrelevant, because principles

of individual liberty that govern the choices justify the end result. The related “caveat emptor”

argument is generally persuasive to American courts, reflecting the view that each individual

owner should be bound by the terms of her contract, and that the state should not interfere to

remake that agreement. I have considered this argument elsewhere (McKenzie 1998b) and

argued that the premises for the caveat emptor perspective often do not apply, because in many

cases the contracts that create homeowner associations are in reality adhesion contracts, the terms

of which are incomprehensible to the average buyer and non-negotiable in any event. In any

event, it seems to me that the social and political consequences of private residential government

are too significant to be left to individual market choices.

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The homeowner association is not a passing fashion but an important institution

reflecting the ideological shift toward privatism that is characteristic of the neoliberal consensus.

Institutions insinuate themselves into people’s lives, shaping the way they think and the choices

they make. Mandatory membership homeowner associations induce people to identify with a

small neighborhood of people with similar social and economic characteristics, either by

cooperating with the association or by opposing it. This is a kind of localized identity formation

that otherwise might not happen. Some scholars, particularly those of communitarian leanings,

like to think of this process as social capital formation, or as an embodiment of the “defensible

space” theory, and some think it is a voluntary community. But my interpretation is that typically

this institution gathers a group of affluent people together and forces them to think of themselves

in relationship to the institution and the neighborhood it represents. It also locks them together

economically to do things that otherwise local government would do.

And, although developers started this institution, in the last decade state and local

governments have taken the lead in promoting the spread of CID housing.

What is the relationship of gated communities to this privatization process and the

institution that is at its core? Taken together, these things—homeowner associations,

privatization, and gated communities—resemble the construction of a

is an ancient concept dating to pre-Roman times and used in the demarcation of Rome itself. The

pomerium was not necessarily a real wall, although it had physical markers. It was a symbolic,

sanctified boundary that separated civilization from barbarism, order from chaos, and civil peace

from anarchy. The pomerium was, in essence, an imaginary line drawn around the spiritual city.

pomerium. The pomerium

PRACTICES:

HOMEOWNER ASSOCIATIONS, SECURITY WALLS,

AND DEVELOPMENT TRENDS IN LAS VEGAS

Las Vegas is the fastest growing city, in the fastest growing county, in the fastest growing

state in the United States of America. The spread of CID housing as the dominant form of new

residential development is especially dramatic in the Las Vegas area. Nearly all new construction

is in planned residential subdivisions with homeowner association private governments. In order

to maintain low taxes with an astronomical growth rate, Las Vegas and Clark County promote

CID housing, which offers those who can afford it a range of privatized services, and minimizes

demands on local government. As Gottdeiner observes,

While master-planned communities have been criticized as being insular for isolating

themselves from the surrounding community, that is exactly what many homebuyers

want…In short, they seek services and protection they can no longer expect from

municipal government. Thus, while some may criticize them as sterile, master-planned

communities continue to be a great success in the Las Vegas region, where developers

continue to build and sell thousands of homes per year. (Gottdeiner 1999, 153)

While there is clearly a demand for such locations, their proliferation is no mere

byproduct of market forces. The City of Las Vegas virtually mandates that new development be

done with homeowner associations. This is a two-step process. First, the city’s Zoning Code and

Development Code are administered to require that all new development contain certain features,

including a landscaping plan, open spaces, and often security walls. Then, elsewhere in these

codes, the city requires that if such features are included—which they must be—then there must

be a homeowner association to maintain them. For example, in the following excerpt from Title

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18 of the Las Vegas Zoning Code Section 18.12.5600, the word “shall” was recently substituted

for the word “may” to provide as follows:

18.12.5600 Landscaping Plan

as an integral part of subdivision design. Such a plan shall be prepared and submitted

with each final map application addressing the landscape design of the subdivision with

respect to such features as wall or fence design; land forms or berms; rocks and boulders;

trees and plant materials; sculpture, art, paving materials, street furniture; and subdivision

entrance statement; common area landscaping and other open space areas…Where

common lots are shown for landscaping, the applicant shall cause the creation of a

homeowners association for purposes of owning the common lot and maintaining the

landscaping.

The code further provides that “All walls, setback areas and landscaping created to

accommodate these regulations shall be located on private property. If in common ownership, the

property shall be owned and maintained by a Homeowner’s Association.” (Las Vegas Zoning

Code, Section 18.12.570, subsection C. And Chapter 19 of the Zoning Code requiers that in

Residential Planned Development Districts, “All development with 12 or more dwelling units

shall provide 15 percent useable open space for passive and active recreational uses.”

The City’s Urban Design Guidelines and Standards are similar, stating, “All required

landscaping shall be properly maintained, based on standard landscaping practices, by the

property owner(s) and/or supported by a perpetual Homeowner’s Association budget, or a

reasonable alternative approved by the City.” I am informed by a representative of the Southern

Nevada Builders’ Association that no such “reasonable alternative to an association has been

approved to date. The same Guidelines and Standards provide that “Developers may provide and

plant street medians on public and private streets as long as they are supported by a perpetual

Homeowner’s Association.” And elsewhere, common open spaces, which must be HOA

controlled are required: “Private and common open spaces are to be provided in Residential

Planned Development Districts and in multi-family residential developments.”

Title 19 of the city Zoning Code provides for HOA controlled private streets and gated

entrances: “Subdivisions developed with private streets must have a mandatory property owners

association which includes all property served by private streets. The association shall own and

be responsible for the maintenance of private streets and appurtenances…The entrances to all

private streets must be marked with a sign stating that it is a private street. Guard houses, access

control gates and cross arms may be constructed.” (Chapter 19A.04).

The nearby booming city of Henderson has similar requirements. First, the Planned Unit

Development portions of the Development Code require landscaping: “Perimeter landscaping

with a minimum depth of 25 feet shall be provided abutting all arterial streets with a width of 100

feet or more. Perimeter landscaping with a minimum depth of 20 feet shall be provided abutting

all arterial streets with a width of less than 100 feet.” (Henderson Development Code, Sec. 19.5.4,

p. 88). And, “common useable open space shall be provided in a central location readily

accessible to all lots.” Then, the Code requires that, “All common areas shall be installed by the

developer according to a schedule as approved by the City. Maintenance shall be the

responsibility of a Property Owners’ Association.” The Code goes on to state as follows:

. A landscaping plan shall be provided by the subdivider

17. Property Owners Association

Property Owners Association for the individual subdivision or be part of a Master

Association. The Association shall be responsible for the maintenance and upkeep of all

. Each RS-6 PUD shall either establish and maintain a

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common areas as well as the enforcement of covenants and restrictions of the

development.” (Henderson Development Code, Chapter 19.5.17)

Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman was forced to respond to these “complaints that

ordinances on the books since 1997 mandate all new subdivisions be structured as homeowner

associations,” saying to angry builders and owners only that, “We can see if we can make some

adjustments.” (City Life, 2000). But such adjustments are neither forthcoming nor likely. The

City of Las Vegas not only requires HOAs in new development, but also encourages existing

neighborhoods that do not have homeowner associations to form them. In 1998, the Las Vegas

City Council unanimously approved a measure directing city staff to work with neighborhood

“community associations” in “crafting plans to guide development” in the City (Zapler 1998)

Through the Neighborhood Services Department, the City has induced over 150 different

neighborhood associations to form (Gottdeiner 1999, 182).

There is one other major ingredient driving the current political economy of Las Vegas,

and that is the competition between the City of Las Vegas and Clark County for tourist dollars.

Downtown Las Vegas, known as “Glitter Gulch,” was the home of the original Las Vegas

casinos. But over the last twenty years, these casinos have been eclipsed by the construction of

giant, spectacular “mega-casinos” on Las Vegas Boulevard, or “The Strip,” outside the city

limits. These mega -casinos are close to downtown and closer to the major airport, but are in

Clark County. They drain tourist revenue from the city, creating a uniquely intense version of the

city-suburb competition for business that is typical of most American metro area. During the

1990s, the City of Las Vegas has fought back against the mega-casinos with a massive downtown

redevelopment effort. Over one-half billion dollars in development funds are being channeled

through the Center City Development Corporation (CCDC), a non-profit corporation that is a

“private-public partnership” modeled after the entity use to redevelop downtown San Diego,

California.

And as in other downtown redevelopment efforts, the poor stand in the path of the City’s

economic resurgence in its competition with the county. The City recently forced one of the

area’s largest homeless shelters out of Las Vegas, denying it title to 10 acres of land it had been

operating on, just north of downtown. As the Mayor and a city council member put it,

"I don't want to see Las Vegas become the only center for the homeless in this valley,"

Las Vegas Mayor Oscar Goodman said. "This is a problem that must be shared with the

entire region." Las Vegas Councilman Lawrence Weekly said he doesn't want a

"homeless Taj Mahal" built on the premises, where a shelter, medical clinic, crisis

intervention facility and job counseling center have operated since the San Diego-based

charity expanded to Las Vegas. (Moller 2001)

Councilman Weekly’s ward includes not only the homeless “Taj Mahal” he spoke of so

compassionately, but also Bonanza Village. As we shall see, the Bonanza Village episode

illustrates the dynamics just described.

CASE STUDY: THE BONANZA VILLAGE WALL

Bonanza Village is a development of single family homes in what is known as the “West

Side” of the City of Las Vegas. The development was established in 1946 with 168 lots. The area

was at that time on the western edge of the city, bordering on the desert. But over the years the

city has spread so far to the west that now the so-called West Side is actually located near the

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center of the city. The West Side is the historically black area of Las Vegas, although in recent

years there has been an influx of Hispanic residents. Bonanza Village is located about 1.5 miles

northwest of downtown Las Vegas, or “Glitter Gulch,” the location of the original casinos that is

currently undergoing large -scale redevelopment.

Bonanza Village is bordered by four streets: on the north by Owens, on the east by

Martin Luther King, Jr., on the south by Washington, and on the west by Tonopah. As originally

constructed the development could be entered by automobile at five places from these public

streets, from all four compass points. It was, and is, zoned “R-E,” or “Residential Estates.” This

classification, sometimes called “horse lots,” bears the official description of providing for “low

density residential units located on large lots and conveying a rural environment.” The lots are

over half an acre in size. There were restrictive covenants, including a whites-only race

restrictive covenant, recorded against the lots at the time of original construction, but, as was

normal for that era, these covenants did not create a homeowner association to enforce them.

There are no private streets or other “common area,” meaning property owned jointly by all

residents. The covenants allow residents a great deal of latitude in the use of their land as long as

it remains a single family dwelling. They are allowed to have various kinds of outbuildings

including stables, guest or servants quarters, and greenhouses; grow crops for wholesale as long

as they do not put up advertising signs; and have a “reasonable number” of animals, including

dogs, cats, and horses, and up to twelve chickens and six rabbits

Many of the houses in Bonanza Village were built in the 1950s and 1960s, and a

substantial number are still occupied by the original owners. These are older people, many living

on fixed incomes. But over the last two decades, there has been an influx of younger, more

affluent residents to Bonanza Village. Presently, the development is more or less evenly divided

between these two groups (Edwards 2000). The newer residents envision remaking Bonanza

Village in the mold of the newer subdivisions, with a homeowner association, walls and a gate,

and a high standard of property maintenance. Given the large lot sizes and proximity to the

redeveloping downtown, they anticipate that a substantial increase in property values would result

if they could make the property fit the expectations of home buyers like themselves—young,

professional, and racially diverse. But older residents are accustomed to the freedom and the

relaxed, near-rural lifestyle that Bonanza Village has always had, and they are fearful that they

will lose their homes through the increase in property taxes and maintenance costs that could

result from gentrification of their development.

The dispute over the Bonanza Village wall is in large part a conflict between these two

groups, and the wall came to symbolize the gentrified Bonanza Village envisioned by the newer

residents and feared by the older ones. The dispute began in the early 1980s, and at every turn

the wall advocates identified themselves as voluntary homeowner association.

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Efforts to close off Bonanza Village from the surrounding areas were in evidence as early

as 1981, a group of residents calling themselves the Bonanza Village Homeowners Association

successfully petitioned the City of Las Vegas to vacate four of the five intersections from which

Bonanza Village could be entered, leaving only the entrance from Washington at Comstock on

the south of the development.

The city conditioned its surrender of these streets on the homeowner association

installing “crash gates” at three of the vacated intersections and keeping them locked at all times

but available for emergency access. These gates were never installed, and instead the association

put concrete traffic barriers in place. The net result of this episode was that the city allowed the

notional homeowner association to close the development to vehicle traffic except from the south.

Pedestrians could still walk into the development at these intersections. Some residents protested

the action, but to no avail (Null 1981; Hawley 1982; Ogilvie 1982).

Much of Bonanza Village’s perimeter had been enclosed over the years by walls or

fences erected by most of the 65 lot owners who lived on the perimeter of the development. With

these barriers to entry, and the closed streets, there was enough security and separation from the

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surrounding neighborhood and security for many residents. However, others were not satisfied

with these measures and they began to campaign for construction of a full perimeter wall.

In 1985, the Bonanza Village Homeowner Association—an unincorporated and voluntary

organization--requested creation of a Special Improvement District in order to build a wall around

the development. A letter from the association to the City Attorney in 1985 requested creation of

an SID for “construction of a masonry wall on the perimeter of Bonanza Village at locations

where said wall is non-existent.” The wall and SID, said the association, would produce

“improved security of total Village area,” “improved property value,” “improved safety for all

residents,” “environmental improvement (reduction of noise level; reduction of vehicle traffic,”

and “better control of unwanted foot traffic” (Simon, et al., 1985). This effort failed.

In 1990, a group of the newer residents attempted to secure passage of an amended set of

deed restrictions which would have created a mandatory membership homeowner association for

Bonanza Village. An incorporated association with power to enforce restrictive covenants would

have been able to finance a wall with homeowner assessments and build a wall without

petitioning the city to create a SID. However, the effort encountered sufficient opposition from

other residents that it failed. Thereafter, the pro-gentrification residents returned to the earlier

approach of using the voluntary homeowner association to petition the city for creation a special

improvement district to finance the wall construction (Williams 2000).

In 1997, the effort began to gain momentum. A new president of the Bonanza Village

Homeowner Association—which was still not incorporated--introduced herself to the

membership in January of that year and announced what would prove to be the pivotal event that

would make the association’s wall a reality: the City of Las Vegas now wanted the wall to be

constructed:

I look forward to working together to make a reality that much talked about block wall.

The City has re-committed itself to the block wall by assigning a full time staff person to

help us achieve our goal. The individual will be working with us from the Neighborhood

Preservation Office on Owens. This is a new and exciting development and shows a

commitment we’ve never had before. There is much development going on around us as

well as inside (There are two new homes currently under construction in the Village). As

I see it, right now is the best time for all of us to pull together to get our wall completed.

I truly hope that you will make a commitment to become more involved in improving

Bonanza Village in 1997. Yes, it’s been difficult, yes, we’ve gone down this road before,

but I say that’s no reason to stop trying! We as homeowners are responsible for what

Bonanza Village looks like and what it is. If we really want to look better, IT’S UP TO

US to clean it up. I’m willing to take responsibility for that and all I need is YOUR

HELP. If the City doesn’t come through for us, I say we come up with another plan and

do it ourselves! Let’s do more than talk, let’s work together to save Bonanza Village.

WE CAN DO IT!. (underlining added; capitalization in original) (Phillips 1997)

The City of Las Vegas was, indeed, now supporting the wall project, with the city

councilman for Bonanza Village’s ward now pushing the project through. This time the project

made sense to a city that was determined to redevelop and gentrify its downtown areas to keep

pace with the County-based Strip. Bonanza Village lay within the West Side areas added in 1988

and 1996 to a special district called the Downtown Redevelopment Area. This district was

receiving special treatment from the City through the Center City Development Corporation, a

non-profit corporation that was coordinating half a billion dollars in downtown redevelopment

efforts. The Bonanza Village wall, and other efforts to make the old neighborhood look like a

contemporary gated community, were consistent with the City’s overall redevelopment campaign.

The wall opponents were no longer just opposing a group of their own neighbors. They were

now, literally, fighting city hall. The association notified the residents in April 1997 that,

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[T]he city now appears to be eager to get this project completed. Councilman Reese is

applying pressure to the department of public works and other city offices to make them

“get on the stick” and quit procrastinating…A “special agent” has been appointed whose

job it is to see that difficulties encountered in the planning and completion of the wall are

quickly resolved…The department of public works has completed detailed drawings of

the perimeter wall. The wall being planned will be 8 feet high. (Bonanza Village

Homeowner Association 1997)

This communiqué also revealed that the association’s plans for Bonanza Village’s

makeover with the gated community image went beyond a mere eight foot wall: “We are

planning to do something nice to the Comstock entrance as a part of the wall project…We would

like to get some kind of nice sign out front saying Bonanza Village and there has been talk of a

guard house being built in the island.”

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There were two kinds of homeowner approval needed. First was the requirement of

Nevada Revised Statutes Chapter 271 that SID creation be supported by a petition signed by

66.67 % of the owners who would be assessed. During 1997, the association went about the

project gathering signatures on a petition to create the SID. The petition was drafted by the city

for this purpose. There was major controversy over whether this requirement was satisfied, and

anti-wall forces claimed the signatures had been collected over many years, were obtained with

false information on the cost of the wall, included signators who no longer lived in the

development, and included others who had changed their minds. By September, 2000, 86

complaints from anti-wall residents—a majority of the current residents of the development--

were sent to the state Ombudsman for Common Interest Communities. The complainants

asserted that “their subdivision was illegally organized…without the homeowners’ knowledge,”

and that the protesters “do not want to be represented by the Bonanza Village Homeowners

Association” (Ashworth 2000). But the City and ultimately the courts decided that the petition

requirement had been satisfied, regardless of these protests.

However, there was another set of signatures needed. The chief impediment to what was

now a joint effort of the City and the homeowner association proved to be the need to obtain

easements over the 65 properties that lay on the perimeter of Bonanza Village, where the wall

would be contructed. The City needed a permanent easement for the wall itself, and also a larger

temporary construction easement, and these required intrusion on private property rights. The

homeowner association worked to obtain signatures on both the SID petition and the easement

documents. But ultimately 13 of these perimeter owners did not sign the easement documents in

time, and this precipitated the litigation which eventually took the Bonanza Village case to the

Nevada Supreme Court.

The city set up an aggressive schedule for creating the SID and building the wall, all of

which was to be done between February 1998 and February 1999. One of the items on the

schedule was “Protest Disposal Resolution,” set for May 11, 1998. After the scheduled rejection

of anticipated protests by city council resolution, the ordinance creating the SID was to receive its

first public reading. (Bonanza Village Times 1998)

The schedule had to be set back a bit, and the protests were not rejected until October 12,

1998. Then, the president and vice president of the Bonanza Village Homeowner Association

addressed the Las Vegas City Council at a public hearing on September 28, 1998, to advocate for

the wall project. They began by arguing that the wall was a crime prevention measure needed to

prevent petty burglaries committed with shopping carts. The facts, which were no doubt known

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to everybody in the room, were that the crime rate in Las Vegas was plummeting, paralleling a

similar drop in crime rates across the nation.

much more eloquent in portraying the wall as an esthetic measure that would make Bonanza

Village look like other, newer, communities, and thereby make the neighborhood look like part of

the downtown redevelopment. This, they said, would stimulate community pride and enhance

property values. The president of the association spoke first (Las Vegas City Council 1998):

Our reasons for wanting a security wall around Bonanza Village are the same reasons

security walls have been and are currently being built, in fact, it seems to be the norm

nowadays, in many Southern Nevada neighborhoods surrounding ours, like Summerlin,

Green Valley, The Lakes, and Rancho Circle. We want to discourage crime; namely,

petty burglaries that occur on foot with the aid of a shopping cart. It’s hard to push a

shopping cart filled with a television or a lawn mower through a block wall, but this is the

kind of crime that is occurring in our neighborhood. So, like our surrounding neighbors,

we wish to deter these crimes as well as protect our investments. We want to maintain a

sense of neighborhood pride and improve the appearance of the whole area. Just like

those other homeowners, we expect certain improvements for our tax dollars. Further

because we are one of the oldest neighborhoods in Southern Nevada, meaning we have

been paying taxes for a longer time, we need to know that the City has not turned its back

on us because of the new kids on the block. Bonanza Village lies smack dead in the

middle of a major downtown redevelopment that we want to be a part of. There is the

Fourth Street Corridor project under way, the old Union pacific Railroad land that now

has a beautiful new County building in place, and right on Bonanza the old Dula City

Swimming Pool is being brought back to life. Why should our neighborhood be left

behind? The approval of the SID will breathe new life into the Martin Luther

King/Washington/Vegas Drive area with the building of a security wall and will serve as

an example for others in our area to show what neighborhood pride can do and make—

can be done to revitalize an old and impoverished area. It will stimulate neighborhood

pride and make Bonanza Village a part of the new downtown.

The president was followed by the association vice president, who added to her

comments, noting among other things that the city—not the association--had prepared the petition

that the HOA circulated to obtain the signatures needed to proceed with the SID, and then

proceeding to advocate for the wall purely because it would make Bonanza Village look like

nearby gated communities:

There is some new development that’s happening in our area that we’re excited about.

The Andre Agassi Boys and Girls Club looks really good. The Veterans Hospital close

by us looks good. There’s a new Post Office going in. And also there’s a subdivision

that has planted itself north of us. It’s single family homes and they have a really nice

wall running along Vegas Drive. Now all these good looking projects, when they look

across the road or into our area, they see what typical horse zoned property, the back side,

lots of typical horse zoned property looks like. It’s a mish-mash of different fencing.

Sometimes you’re not going to put your lumber pile in the front yard if you got a half

acre. That’s one of the reasons you own it is so that you can have a few things other than

just landscaping. And so a lot of that stuff winds up in the back yards… The project is

not only good for Bonanza Village, but it’s good for the City. If we do not build this

wall, Bonanza Village will fall behind the level of the new developments coming into our

area and we don’t want that. We’re an inner-city neighborhood that’s willing to spend

our own money to bring itself up to the level of the new stuff that’s moving in around us.

4 But after this rather lame justification, they became

12

A third wall supporter made the case even more bluntly, saying, “Today we would like to

see Bonanza Village in the same capacity as any other gated community.”

Those who objected to the wall spoke at this hearing as well, but in the minds of many

the outcome was a foregone conclusion. Five weeks later, on November 9, 1998, Special

Improvement District 1463 was created. The degree to which the City was willing to overlook

obstacles in its rush to build the wall was illustrated by an indemnity agreement which was

entered into on that date between the City of Las Vegas and the Bonanza Village Homeowners’

Association, “a Nevada corporation.” In fact, the association was not incorporated, and did not

incorporate until nearly a year and a half later, on April 7, 2000, with a grand total of 22

members.

But this minor matter—that the city was entering into a contract with an organization that

had no corporate existence—did not stop the City. The indemnity agreement set out the

arrangement for financing, building, and maintaining the wall. Bonanza Village became Special

Improvement District No. 1463 for purposes of building the wall. All property owners within the

development were to pay equal shares for construction of the wall, pursuant to state statute.

Other documents show that the brown, eight-foot high, cinder block wall—two miles of it in all--

was expected to cost over $800,000, and that each lot would be assessed over $5000 to pay for it

(the final cost to be determined after the wall was built), with up to ten years to pay the principal

and interest. After the wall was constructed, the association was to be fully responsible for

maintaining the wall, and the association also agreed to defend and indemnify the City against

any claims made arising from the existence of the wall. The president of the association signed

the indemnification agreement for “Bonanza Village Homeowners Association, Inc.”—the

corporation which did not exist—as did the Mayor Pro-Tem on behalf of the City of Las Vegas.

But, remarkably, the indemnification agreement was then recorded against every lot in Bonanza

Village, as though it were a mandatory membership organization that spoke for all residents,

when in fact it was voluntary and even as late as 2000 only had 22 members. This raised the

possibility in the minds of many owners that they would become individually responsible for

liability under the indemnification agreement, given the fact that the voluntary homeowner

association had no way to raise money except by asking for it from residents and hoping for the

best.

Later, on the Fourth of July of the year 2000, a Bonanza Village homeowner would write

to City Councilman Larry Weekly, the new representative for their ward, to point out the problem

of the non-existent association, and to ask, “Doesn’t the City require documentation that a

Homeowners Association is a Bona -Fide one before awarding $825,000 for an SID?” After

some six weeks had passed, one of Weekly’s employees passed the letter on for reply to the

Supervisor of the Special Improvement District, who responded with breathtaking cynicism,

writing that “The fact that a homeowner association exists in a neighborhood has nothing to do

with the SID process. Their only involvement in this case was to walk the petition around to get

the supporting signatures to start the process.” (Thompson 2000)

Armed with the Special District legislation and the indemnification agreement with the

association, the City proceeded against the Bonanza Village perimeter residents who had not

granted the City easements over their property. Foremost among these was Cuthbert Mack, an

attorney. Mack and other opponents of the wall continued to organize and fight against the wall.

When it became clear that a number of perimeter property owners would not voluntarily sign

away the easements, the city decided to exercise eminent domain and take their property.

June 28, 1999, the City Council authorized filing complaints in eminent domain against the

recalcitrant owners, and on October 19, 1999, the case of City of Las Vegas v. Mack, Case No.

A410116, was filed in the Clark County District Court.

Mack’s argument was that the City lacked authority to take his property for the wall

project, and the eminent domain action violated the Due Process Clauses of the Unites States and

Nevada Constitutions. His central contention was that there was in reality no public use involved,

5 On

13

and that his property was being taken by the City for a what amounted to a private use. He also

argued that there was no objective need for the wall, there was no need to take his property to

construct a wall, and that the City had failed to follow the statutory requirements for SID creation,

including lack of notice. (City of Las Vegas v. Mack, Case No. A410116, Motion to Dismiss

Plaintiff’s Complaint, p. 2, lines 13-19). In a separate suit (Mack v. Bonanza Village

Homeowners Association , Case No. A421503) Mack also requested an injunction to stop

construction of the wall until the case could be fully adjudicated, as well as declaratory relief.

On January 31, 2000, the District Court denied Mack’s motion to dismiss the eminent

domain complaint. On April 8, Mack petitioned the Nevada Supreme Court for a writ of

prohibition. On May 3, the City awarded the wall construction contract to a builder, but on June

16, the Nevada Supreme Court issued an order staying the project until it could consider the

merits of the case.

It was at this point that the City revealed just how determined it was to build the wall.

The City took the position that the Supreme Court’s order only applied to the Mack property, and

not the rest of the development. The City ordered the contractor to proceed with the construction,

and so they did. Existing fences and walls were bulldozed, trenches were dug, temporary chain -

link fencing was erected, and piles of cinder blocks and rebar were stacked all around Bonanza

Village. Fire hydrants, water main valves, and telephone poles that serviced Bonanza Village

were walled out of the development.

6

On July 25, Mack requested a contempt citation from the Supreme Court to punish the

City for violating the order. On August 3, the Supreme Court issued another order reaffirming

the earlier one, and making it clear that the order to stop construction applied to the entire project.

At this point, the City halted the project.

The Supreme Court made it’s third and final ruling in the case on March 15, 2001,

denying Mack’s request for a writ of prohibition. The court ruled that Mack had failed to file a

timely written objection to the SID as required by NRS 271.305, and therefore had waived his

right to object and did not have standing to challenge the formation of the district. On the merits

of his claim, the court held that:

[T]he district court did not exceed its jurisdiction by denying petitioners’ motion to

dismiss the City of Las Vegas’ eminent domain complaint because the right of eminent

domain is an attribute of sovereignty, the express provisions of NRS Chapter 37 and 271

authorize the City to condemn property for local improvements, and a security wall is

defined as a local improvement pursuant to NRS 271.203. Thus, the City’s formation of

a special improvement district (SID) and its efforts to condemn petitioners’ property for

purposes of constructing a security wall are not unconstitutional (Order Denying Petition

for Writ of Prohibition, Mack v. Eighth Judicial District, Case No. 36091; underlining

added).

The underlined language reflects a provision of Nevada law which specifically defines a

security wall as a “local improvement,” so that the City was not required to produce any further

justification—a security wall is,

City in a case involving a special improvement district, the court was upholding a heavy, express,

legislative presumption in favor of the validity of such projects. The relevant provisions of

Nevada law made this clear:

per se, a project with a public purpose. And in ruling for the

NRS 271.020 Legislative declaration.

determination:

1. That providing for municipalities to which this chapter appertains the purposes,

powers, duties, rights, disabilities, privileges, liabilities and immunities herein provided

It is hereby declared as a matter of legislative

14

will serve a public use and will promote the health, safety, prosperity, security and

general welfare of the inhabitants thereof and of the State of Nevada.

2. That the acquisition, improvement, equipment, maintenance and operation of any

project herein authorized is in the public interest, is conducive to the public welfare, and

constitutes a part of the established and permanent policy of the State of Nevada.

3. That the necessity for this chapter is a result of the large population growth and

intense residential, commercial and industrial development in the incorporated and

unincorporated areas of portions of the state and of the ensuing need for extensive local

improvements therein.

4. That the legislature recognizes the duty of municipalities as instruments of state

government to meet adequately the needs for such facilities within their boundaries, in

cooperation with the state, counties and districts within the state.

5. That for the accomplishment of these purposes, the provisions of this chapter shall

be broadly construed, and the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are to be

strictly construed shall have no application to this chapter.

6. That the notices herein provided are reasonably calculated to inform each

interested person of his legally protected rights.

7. That the rights and privileges herein granted and the duties, disabilities and

liabilities herein provided comply in all respects with any requirement or limitation

imposed by any constitutional provision.

(Added to NRS by 1965, 1349)

NRS 271.025 Decision of governing body prima facie evidence of

correctness.

chapter, the action and decision of a municipality’s governing body as to all matters

passed upon by it in relation to any action, matter or thing provided in this chapter is, in

the absence of fraud, prima facie evidence of its correctness.

(Added to NRS by 1965, 1349; A 1991, 1872)

And, as the court noted, security walls were specifically listed among the projects to be

given presumptive approval as public improvements:

Except for an action or decision made conclusive by a provision of this

NRS 271.265 General powers of cities, counties and towns.

1. The governing body of a county, city or town, upon behalf of the municipality and

in its name, without any election, may from time to time acquire, improve, equip, operate

and maintain, within or without the municipality, or both, within and without the

municipality:

(a) A commercial area vitalization project;

(b) A curb and gutter project;

(c) A drainage project;

(d) An offstreet parking project;

(e) An overpass project;

(f) A park project;

(g) A sanitary sewer project;

(h) A security wall;

(i) A sidewalk project;

(j) A storm sewer project;

(k) A street project;

(l) A street beautification project;

(m) A transportation project;

(n) An underpass project;

15

(o) A water project; and

(p) Any combination of such projects.

The statute further defines the term “security wall” so as to encompass any wall intended

to protect residents from “vandalism”:

NRS 271.203 “Security wall” defined.

stone, brick, concrete, concrete blocks, masonry or similar building material, together

with footings, pilasters, outriggers, grillwork, gates and other appurtenances, constructed

around the perimeter of a residential subdivision with respect to which a final map has

been recorded pursuant to

in the subdivision and their occupants from vandalism.

(Added to NRS by 1983, 870)

The statute even defines exactly how SID funded security walls are to be paid for. The

legislation states that walls benefit all residents equally, so payment is to be equal:

“Security wall” means any wall composed ofNRS 278.360 to 278.460, inclusive , to protect the several tracts

NRS 271.367 Apportionment of assessments for security wall.

afforded by a security wall benefits each tract in the subdivision, in addition to any other

basis for apportioning the assessments authorized in

the governing body may apportion the assessments for a security wall on the basis that all

tracts in the subdiv ision share equally in the cost and maintenance of the project.

(Added to NRS by 1983, 871)

With this Supreme Court decision, all opposition to the Bonanza Village wall was

effectively crushed, and the City resumed construction of the wall. In a stroke of great irony, the

homeowners’ association also obtained a grant from the City to put up a sign at its one remaining

entrance, where the anticipated gate and guard house will be built. The sign is a rock bearing the

legend “Bonanza Village, Est. 1946.” The sign invokes the long heritage of the community,

symbolizing the original Bonanza Village, where residents lived as they chose at the edge of the

desert, with horses, chickens, sheds, and crops. This was the very Bonanza Village that the new

residents wanted to eradicate, and the homeowner association that erected the sign was their most

important instrument for doing so. That the sign was paid for by the city that bulldozed the entire

perimeter of the area compounds the irony. The sign commodif ies the area’s semi-rural heritage

as a selling point for a neighborhood well on its way to becoming another gated, walled, and

homeowner association controlled subdivision, against the will of many if not most of its

residents.

As of this writing, Cuthbert Mack was about to lose his home in foreclosure for refusing

to pay his share of the cost for the wall. Mack and 35 other residents did not pay, and their homes

thus became subject to foreclosure by the city. In Mack’s case, the amount for which he was

willing to lose his home over this issue was a paltry $1391. (Couzens 2003)

This episode is replete with ironies and contradictions. It shows the suburbanization of

cities, with institutions such as homeowner associations, that were invented to facilitate suburban

secession, becoming a tool for urban redevelopment as well. The rhetoric of government

responding the wishes of its citizen is used to legitimize and obscure the fact that it is suing them

to take their land. The contract with a corporation that didn’t exist suggests that the incorporated

homeowner association is so central to this type of activity that the city willed it into existence.

And the ultimate irony may be that a development that was created with restrictive covenants to

Because the protectionNRS 271.010 to 271.360, inclusive,

16

keep out African-Americans is now run by African-Americans who are fighting to keep out the

riffraff, using new tools of exclusion that are far more sophisticated than race restrictive

covenants.

In City of Walls , Teresa Caldeira writes,

All fortified enclaves share some basic characteristics. They are private property for

collective use, and they emphasize the value of what is private and restricted at the same

time that they devalue what is public and open in the city. They are physically

demarcated and isolated by wall, fences, empty spaces, and design devices. They are

turned inward, away from the street, whose public life they explicitly reject…they belong

not to their immediate surrounding but to largely invisible networks…Finally, the

enclaves tend to be socially homogeneous environments…Fortified enclaves confer

status. (Caldeira 2000, 258)

What Caldeira found to be true in Sao Paolo could have been written of Bonanza Village.

The affluent residents who are transforming their neighborhood into a fortified enclave, and the

city officials that did the work for them, are part of the invisible network of professionals who

understand the significance of secure residential compounds. The drive to wall-in Bonanza

Village was an attempt to enhance the status of the development and raise its property values.

While lip service was paid to crime prevention, the truth was that the residents who formed the

Bonanza Village Homeowner Association were seeking status. In this respect, they were merely

emulating their counterparts in the developer-created homeowner associations all around them.

And the city, speaking the same language, saw the value of imposing the wall on the

community’s recalcitrant residents. Higher property values mean higher property tax revenues,

and the wall, it was felt, would make Bonanza Village a neighborhood whose appearance would

contribute to the overall ambience of the redeveloping downtown area.

In this context, it must have seemed an easy choice to exercise eminent domain, take

people’s property from them by lawsuit and force, bulldoze their fences and yards, and even

disregard a direct order from the state Supreme Court. The overriding consideration, it seems,

was to extend the pomerium around this piece of real estate, to embrace these 168 lots within the

arms of the sanctified, symbolic wall that separates civilization from barbarism, civil peace from

chaos, and us from them. And underlying the rhetorical superstructure of community betterment

and neighborhood empowerment, what happened at Bonanza Village exposes the new

architecture of control that polices this boundary. This apparatus is comprised of special districts,

homeowner associations, private-public partnerships and other special purpose, hybrid

creations—a fusion of sta te, market, and civil society in which the categories and concepts of

liberal democracy are irrelevant and alien.

REGULATION:

URBAN RESTRUCTURING, BAD PRESS, HOMEOWNER NETWORKING

AND STATE REGULATION

Private communities are for the most part free to operate within the limits of their

governing documents, with little outside interference. They are largely unregulated. Federal

policy regarding housing is for the most part promotional, in the sense that the federal

government has for at least 75 years worked, successfully, to increase the home ownership rate in

the US. Since the early 1960s the Federal Housing Administration and other federal entities

have also promoted the growth of common interest housing. But at the state level, the policies

17

are often, and increasingly, more regulatory in nature. There are also other forces at work in the

press and among rebellious homeowners that sometimes curtail the actions of homeowner

associations. To place these emerging regulatory regimes in context it is important to first

consider the place private residential governance plays in the contemporary debate over the

nature of urban governance. I consider this issue in more detail elsewhere (McKenzie 2003).

URBAN RESTRUCTURING

There is a debate going on among urban policy scholars, professionals, activists, and

policy makers concerning the nature and scale of governance in American metropolitan areas.

Private gated communities play an important role in this debate. It is impossible to do justice to

the entire war of ideas, but I can sketch out the basic contours of the conflict and show how and

why the topic of this conference relates to it so significantly.

In my view, the intellectual and ideological struggle of which I speak is best

characterized as the “centralizers” versus the “decentralizers.” There are three dominant themes

in this struggle: the first is, of course, centralization against decentralization; the second is public

governance versus private governance; and the third is segregation versus integration.

In more specific terms the two camps are polarized over a range of issue areas as follows:

Advocacy coalition THE CENTRALIZERS THE DECENTRALIZERS

Mainspring Activist government Private initiative

Sanctified value Equality Liberty

Choice mechanism Collective choice Individual choice

Legitimizer Democracy Contract

Faith in Government Markets

Buzzword Smart growth Voluntary city

Against what? Anti-sprawl Anti-government

Utopia Regional government Suburban autonomy

Preferred type of

government

General purpose

governments

Special districts and private

gated communities

The centralizers are exemplified by Myron Orfield (2002), David Rusk (1993), and Peter

Dreier, et al. (2001), who argue that the existing system of municipal governance is bad for cities

and suburbs alike, producing chaotic and competitive politics that pit municipalities against each

other in a struggle to acquire affluent homeowners and businesses and exclude the poor. The

outcome, the centralizers argue, is sprawl, segregation, and inequality. They advocate for the

creation of powerful regional governments with broad control over planning, land use,

transportation, and other functions. The decentralizers believe in the economic logic of Robert

Nozick and others who favor individual choices and market mechanisms over collective choice

manifested through large-scale general purpose governments (see Beito 2002).

Private gated communities are often cited as examples of successful decentralization of

government functions and regardless of whether one accepts the verdict that they are successful,

it is beyond serious question that such housing developments are a new and highly decentralized

level of the American intergovernmental system. Much of the time these two advocacy coalitions

argue about abstractions, but in the rise of common interest housing there is a real-life test of one

coalition’s dreams and the others predicted nightmare. If common interest housing continues to

expand, and if homeowner associations are, by and large, able to perform their quasi

18

governmental functions competently, the decentralizers would have a powerful argument to

support their other proposals. But if the market for private gated communities were to fail, or if

associations collapse due to financial and administrative mismanagement, the centralizers would

have support for their argument that higher levels of government are better. These communities

are busy conducting their own internal functions without any awareness of the part they play in

this intellectual and policy debate, but those who write about them are ever conscious of the

stakes.

BAD PRESS: FLAGS, FAT DOGS, AND FORECLOSURES

Adverse publicity is a threat to private communities because it discourages potential

buyers and thus has the potential to undercut the property value -maximization that is their

guiding light. Yet often associations seem to court bad press, which has risen to a crescendo

since September 11, 2001, as one association after another has taken residents to court over flying

the American flag in violation of association rules. Presently, the most highly publicized case is

that of George Andres of Jupiter, Florida. The Indian Creek Phase 3B Homeowners Association

recently won a protracted legal battle against Andres, a US Marine Corps veteran, who erected a

flagpole on his lawn in violation of the association’s rules. He now faces the loss of his home in

foreclosure if he keeps the pole and fails to pay the association’s legal fees, amounting to some

$21,000, but he remains adamant. Conservative talk show hosts Rush Limbaugh and Sean

Hannity have featured Andres’ plight, Florida governor Jeb Bush personally delivered an

American flag to him, along with signing into law a bill passed by the state legislature that

retroactivelyh legalizes what Andres was doing. But this did not dissuade the association or the

local judge, who ruled that the lien for attorney fees was filed before the law became effective

and remains in force. The ruling, delivered with incredibly bad timing the day before the two

year anniversary of 9/11/01, received national attention.

The fate of Andres and his flagpole remains in doubt as of this writing. (Franceschina

2003) But incidents such as this, as well as actual and fictional events depicted on episodes of

ABC’s 20/20, The X Files and other popular programs, and even the comic strip Doonesbury,

portray associations in a negative light. This tends to undermine the market appeal of the product

and serves as a check on association activity. The connection between highly publicized abuses

of individuals and quick reaction by opportunistic state legislators is becoming sufficiently clear

that even industry partisans must begin to understand the need for caution.

HOMEOWNER NETWORKING

There is an increasingly vocal and organized homeowner rights movement. This is

fueled by several convergent forces. First, the internet has enabled what was once a

disaggregated rabble to share ideas, circulate information about legislation, and organize for

political action. Second, there are now many newspaper reporters with some understanding of

this industry and some sympathy for aggrieved owners who have no place to turn. The

connection between owner rights groups and sympathetic reporters empowers the owners still

further. Third, the high level of litigation generated by HOA enforcement actions is costly to the

public treasury and leads to legislatures at least listening to owners who previously were

dismissed as eccentrics.

On the Commons is a weekly internet radio program produced by Shu Bartholomew, a

long-time homeowner rights activist. (

hour each Saturday afternoon interviewing politicians, professionals, academics, and owners on

this topic. Her listeners can quickly become educated about this form of housing and the

prospects for reform around the country.

www.onthecommons.com). Bartholomew spends one

19

There are many other web sites, Yahoo groups, and other focal points on the web for

HOA activists, and their impact can only be expected to increase.

STATE REGULATION

Bad press, owner activism, and costly litigation are all incentives for enterprising state

legislators to get involved with these issues. There are many bills floating through the halls of

several state legislatures as of this writing. Three states—California, Nevada, and New Jersey--

illustrate the main trends visible across the nation.

In California, the courts and the state legislature have long been at odds. A number of

recent California Supreme Court decisions have reinforced the authority of homeowner

association boards over their residents, but the state legislature has often enacted reform measures

indicating a concern for abuses of owner rights by their boards. As recently as the last few

weeks, the state legislature was imposing detailed regulations on association activity (records,

elections, rule changes, and so forth) that resemble those applicable to local governments. Some

in the industry fear that these regulations are a sort of micro-management that will make it

impossible for associations to function with unpaid, untrained, volunteer directors. Lurking in the

wings there is also a comprehensive reform effort run by the California Law Revision

Commission, an advisory body that could propose more sweeping changes. But all of this lacks

any enforcement mechanism, so that the courts become the actual regulatory arm of government.

In Nevada, the legislature has taken a different approach of late and has tried to offer

aggrieved owners something they have never had: a government official to talk to. After passing

reform legislation as in California and feeling that more needed to be done, the legislature first

created the office of Ombudsman for fielding complaints from owners. When the office became

deluged with cases, the legislature took a bolder step and created the Nevada Commission for

Common Interest Communities. This entity, which came into existence only a few months ago,

could if successful offer an approach that other states may emulate, but it is far too early to know.

New Jersey is the site of a third approach. The Rutgers University Law School has a

Constitutional Litigation Clinic headed by prominent civil liberties attorney Frank Askin. Askin,

aided by the New Jersey chapter of the American Civil Liberties Union, has launched a major

legal assault on the protected private status of homeowner associations. The case, involving the

Twin Rivers development, argues that some HOAs are sufficie ntly government-like in their

functions that they should be held accountable to the civil liberties protections of the New Jersey

state constitution. This case (in which I serve as an expert witness for the owners challenging the

association’s actions) could prove to be a major event if the New Jersey Supreme Court accepts

Askin’s arguments.

WILD CARDS

The future of common interest housing and private gated communities could be

determined in large part by some political wild cards. Many people believe that most of these

communities have insufficient reserve funds to make necessary repairs when major building

components wear out, let alone when director or manager incompetence or malfeasance produce

major financial liabilities. Cities, insurance companie s, and real estate developers have become

increasingly clever at finding ways to insulate themselves from these costs. That means that

owner themselves often find themselves forced to pay large special assessments on pain of losing

their homes in foreclosure. If the pace of such unanticipated cost assessments increases, as seems

virtually certain, this could become a political issue that might change the regulatory picture

dramatically in unforeseen ways. Will there be, for example, a reclaiming of these private

20

communities by the state? Or will they be allowed to succeed or fail like a Darwinian

experiment?

A related issue is the possibility of increased homeowner activism in the form of

electoral protest, as happened in 1978 with the celebrated property tax revolt in California. As

the Terminator, Arnold Schwarzenegger, looms on the horizon as possibly the next governor of

California, riding on a tsunami of voter rage at big government, high taxation, and the death of

the California Dream, it is im possible to foreclose any possibility. What can be said with

certainty is that the future of American urban areas cannot be charted without taking into account

the private communities that have become the home of choice for millions.

REFERENCES

Ashworth, M. 2000. Letter from State Ombudsman for Common Interest Communities to

Christine Monroe, Subject: Bonanza Village. September 15.

Beito, D., et al., (eds.) The Voluntary City: Choice, Community, and Civil Society. Ann Arbor,

MI: University of Michigan Press.

Blakely, E, and M. Snyder. 1997. Fortress America: Gated Communities in the United States.

Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.

Bonanza Village Homeowners’ Association. 1997. Block Wall Update. April.

Bonanza Village Times, 1998. Special Notice. February 25.

Caldeira, T. 2000. City of Walls: Crime, Segregation, and Citizenship in Sao Paulo. Berkeley:

University of California.

CityLife. 2000. Private government: Mayor jumps into fray over homeowners associations.

March 30.

Couzens, F. 2003. Bonanza Village owner gets TRO in SID payment dispute. Las Vegas

Tribune (on line edition) August 8.

Dreier, P., et al. 2001. Place Matters: Metropolitics for the Twenty-first Century. Lawrence,

KS: University Press of Kansas.

Edwards, J. 2000. Building fences: controversy stirs an enduring neighborhood. Las Vegas

Review Journal. July 9.

Franceschina, P. 2003. Media focusing on flagpole fight. South Florida Sun-Sentinel (on line

edition). September 13.

Gottdeiner, M., et al.1999. Las Vegas: The Social Production of an All-American City. Oxford:

Blackwell.

Hawley, C. 1982. Memorandum re citizens’ complaint, Bonanza Village street vacations, from

City Clerk of Las Vegas. June 7.

Las Vegas City Council 1998. City Council Minutes. September 28.

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McKenzie, E. 1994. Privatopia: Homeowner Associations and the Rise of Residential Private

Government. New Haven: Yale University Press.

McKenzie, E. 1998a. Homeowner associations and California politics: an exploratory analysis.

Urban Affairs Review

McKenzie, E. 1998b. Reinventing common interest developments: Reflections on a policy role

for the judiciary. 31 John Marshall Law Review 397-427. Winter. Vol. 31, No. 2.

McKenzie, E. 2003. Common Interest Housing in the Communities of Tomorrow. ¨Housing

Policy Debate, forthcoming.

Moller, J. 2001. Council delays decision: fate of shelter will be decided in two weeks. Las

Vegas Review-Journal. April 19.

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City of Las Vegas. September 14.

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Vegas. May 7.

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Brookings Institution.

Phillips, J. 1997. Letter to Bonanza Village residents. January.

Rusk, D. 1993. Cities Without Suburbs. Washington, DC: Woodrow Wilson Center.

Simon, H., et al. 1985. Letter from Bonanza Village Homeowne r Association to City Attorney

George Ogilvie. August 22.

Thompson, M. 2000. Letter to Christine Monroe re Bonanza Village Security Wall. August 14.

Wills, L. 2000. Trouble in paradise: residents of a pastoral old Las Vegas neighborhood are

fighting over an expensive plan to keep out the riffraff. CityLife. July 13.

Zapler, M. 1998. “Neighborhood growth measure OK’d. Las Vegas Review-Journal. March 10.

22

ENDNOTES

1

arrangement for local governments. CID owners pay their full property tax bill, and also their monthly

association assessments. But the assessments pay for services such as snow and leaf removal, trash

collection, and street lighting and maintenance, that duplicate much of what they have already supported

with their property tax payment. New Jersey has a state law which provides for some equalization of this

tax burden, but other states have not yet done so, and it remains an issue which has been discussed but not

resolved in Nevada and other states.

This situation presents the issue of “double taxation” which arises from what is presently a favorable

2

organization that engaged in the subsequent wall efforts described in this paper. It appears to have been

organized around issues pertaining to the neighborhood elementary school on the southwest corner of

Bonanza Village. Its membership included areas outside Bonanza Village, all Bonanza Elementary School

teachers were made honorary members, and the principal office of the corporation was the address of the

elementary school. The incorporation papers describe the corporation’s purposes as to “provide

neighborhood protection,” “improve relationship between the Bonanza Elementary School and the

Community,” “promote neighborhood beautification, maintenance, and improvement of property,”

“support youth activities and recreation within the community,” and “improve public relations within the

community boundaries and with other civic and political entities.” This organization’s corporate status was

permanently revoked on August 29, 1995.

In 1971, the Bonanza Civic and Homeowner Association was incorporated. This was not the

3

and also a place for school children to wait for the bus, because school buses in Clark County do not enter

gated communities and children must go to the entrance of the community to be picked up.

The association circulated an architectural drawing of the proposed entrance, complete with guardhouse,

4

when the wall project began to gain momentum. For Las Vegas, the Metropolitan Police report that

between 1995 and 2000, there was an overall drop in property crimes of almost 38%, including a 40%

reduction in burglary.

According to FBI crime statistics, the crime rate in Nevada dropped by 4.8% between 1987 and 1997,

5

In Mack’s case, the city determined that the easement was worth $1225.

6

conduce extensive work at Bonanza Village. The project includes, among other things, “installation of 31

new fire hydrant assemblies.” The engineer’s estimate for the project was over $1.6 million.

On February 8, 2001, a project notice was put out for bid by the Las Vegas Valley Water District to

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